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Abstract 
Research on mobile agents has attracted much attention as this paradigm has 
demonstrated great potential for the next-generation e-commerce. Proper solutions to 
security-related problems become key factors in the successful deployment of mobile 
agents in e-commerce systems. We propose the use of passport and visa (P/V) for 
securing mobile agent migration across communities based on the SAFER e-commerce 
framework.  P/V not only serves as up-to-date digital credentials for agent-host 
authentication, but also provides effective security mechanisms for online communities to 
control mobile agent migration. Protection for mobile agents, network hosts, and online 
communities is enhanced using P/V. We discuss the design issues in details and evaluate 
the implementation of the proposed system. 
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1. Introduction 
According to the World Trade Organization (WTO), electronic commerce is “the 
production, advertising, sale and distribution of products via telecommunication 
networks” [1]. One noticeable advantage is that e-commerce removes constraints set by 
geographical locations and speeds up traditional transaction processes by electronic 
means. Because monetary transactions are included, security is the number one concern. 
The highly distributed and global nature of the Internet also forces e-commerce systems 
to cope with numerous machines running on different platforms in heterogeneous 
networks. Moreover, current systems based on the client-server architecture are also 
constrained by limited network bandwidth. To overcome these difficulties, secure, cost 
efficient, and intelligent e-commerce systems are needed to ensure “convenience and 
confidence” [2]. 
Mobile agent technology was introduced as a paradigm to build smart e-
commerce systems. It has attracted substantial attention from researchers [3-5]. Mobile 
agents, as defined commonly, are sophisticated software entities that autonomously travel 
through a network environment and make complex decisions on the user’s behalf [6]. The 
critical idea of mobile agent systems, compared to their client-server counterparts, is that 
by migrating to destination machines, mobile agents greatly reduce the consumption of 
network bandwidth and avoid causing excessive network traffic, and at the same time 
process information near data sources. These mobile programs are especially suitable for 
highly distributed applications and may have the potential to overcome some of the 
problems that current e-commerce systems face.  
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 However, the introduction of mobile agents also incurs many security related 
issues [7-9][19]. Users of mobile agents will need to be assured that their agents are safe 
when they are traveling around in the network, i.e., if their agents can be protected from 
attacks and can function as desired. From the network hosts’ point of view, they would 
like to be sure that incoming mobile agents originate from reliable sources and will not 
damage their systems when executed. It can be concluded that the advantage of mobility 
must not be offset by the disadvantages caused by lack of sufficient security protection. 
Thus providing mechanisms to establish trust and reputation in distributed mobile agent 
systems is an extremely important issue. 
  There are technologies that provide services to identify clients in distributed 
systems, such as digital certificates. A certificate is a statement guaranteeing the identity 
of a person or the security of a web site, and is issued by independent certification 
authorities, such as “Verisign” [10]. For mobile agents, this may be the digital certificate 
of its code provider. A certificate is useful for one-hop transport, but may not be enough 
for mobile agents as they typically travel on a multi-hop basis. Furthermore, a digital 
certificate cannot be modified after being issued. While some research focuses on how to 
develop mutual authentication and authorization protocols [11], it is known that a single 
certificate certifying only the code provider is not enough to ensure security in mobile 
agent communities. Following similar lines of thoughts, Lai et al. have described a 
method to electronically represent endorsements, licenses and insurance policies to build 
enhanced confidence in distributed systems [12]. It is desirable that novel types of digital 
credentials that are up-to-date to serve both authentication purpose and some security 
objectives can be developed.  
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 In this paper, we propose using passports and visas for mobile agent migration 
across communities based on the SAFER (Secure Agent Fabrication, Evolution, and 
Roaming for E-commerce) framework [13-15]. SAFER provides an integrated 
framework to manage and secure mobile agents in agent-mediated e-commerce systems. 
Migration refers to the travel of mobile agents from one community to another, while 
passports and visas should be the official travel documents that mobile agents need. The 
Migration Service Center (MSC) proposed in this paper provides services to manage and 
control mobile agents when they are roaming among community hosts, while passports 
and visas serve as up-to-date certificates to achieve integrated security objectives for 
protecting mobile agents, network hosts, and SAFER communities. 
The organization of this paper is as follows. We start by introducing background 
information for the SAFER framework in section 2. In section 3 and section 4, we 
elaborate in details the design and implementation issues for mobile agent migration of 
our proposed P/V system and the MSC entity. We also discuss and evaluate our system in 
these sections. Section 5 concludes this paper.   
 
2. SAFER Background 
Our proposed P/V and migration system are based on SAFER because SAFER 
has already established a rich set of security mechanisms with its community entities. 
Based on SAFER, many e-commerce applications such as auction services and electronic 
payment systems have been proposed [16] [17]. 
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SAFER consists of SAFER-compliant and non-SAFER communities with 
relevant entities inside each community. The following figure shows the basic structure 
and interactions among entities in SAFER communities. 
{Insert Fig. 1 here} 
For the sake of clarity, only entities relevant to our system are shown in Fig. 1. 
From the figure it can be seen that within each SAFER community, we have several 
entities that are key to the functioning of the whole community. For example, the agent 
factory is responsible for fabricating mobile agent programs. According to the 
requirements set by agent owners, it can generate pieces of agent function modules and 
construct standard agent programs that can be dispatched to remote hosts to accomplish 
e-commerce related tasks. After the customization has been done and the fabrication is 
complete, agent programs are ready for downloading by agent owners. In order that the 
identity of the mobile code be recognized and its integrity protected from third party 
verification, agent programs need to be digitally signed by the agent factory before being 
downloaded. Any party can then verify the digital signature of the mobile code using the 
public key of the agent factory. 
Agent butler is an entity that acts on behalf of the agent owner. It is responsible 
for dispatching mobile agents and responding to requests from its agents and other 
parties. The agent butler is also expected to be equipped with sufficient intelligence to 
make smart decisions and control its mobile agents in most cases. However, under certain 
circumstances when crucial decisions are to be made, the owner’s supervision is still 
needed.  
 6 
Besides these public entities within a SAFER community, we still have many host 
machines that belong to the community on which business transactions or e-commerce 
related tasks are performed, such as the “marketplace” server in the figure. These hosts 
include information reservoirs in which databases are maintained, vendor machines that 
sell flight tickets, or transaction servers that process electronic payments. They are also 
intermediate or ultimate destinations for mobile agents who will roam there to complete 
certain specific tasks. 
The gatekeeper of each community is MSC, which is trusted by the public. MSC 
functions as a gateway to facilitate the entry and exit of mobile agents. Further details of 
the MSC functions are given in the next section. 
When mobile agents are roaming among community hosts, we must provide a 
means for hosts to efficiently recognize and verify the true identities of mobile agents. 
Correct authentication is important for follow-up procedures such as authorization and 
execution. From the agents’ perspective, we must be able to provide a means to protect 
mobile agents in order that any compromise may be detected as soon as possible. From 
the communities’ viewpoint, mobile agents should be monitored and controlled. To bring 
these three objectives together, we propose the use of passports and visas for mobile 
agent migration. 
 
3. P/V and Migration Control 
Here we propose passports and visas as credentials issued by MSCs, which are 
official documents for mobile agents to be authenticated by hosts. Through the 
successful verification of P/V, each party is assured that an agent comes from a 
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reliable source and will not perform any malicious attacks. Proper security 
privileges for the incoming agent can then be decided. 
3.1 Motivation 
It has been suggested by many researchers that security issues within mobile 
agent technology can be divided into two areas: protecting hosts and protecting agents 
[18]. However, these two areas can never be clearly distinguished. For example, when a 
host verifies the signature and integrity of a mobile agent, it may detect malicious code 
and thus protect itself. However, if a malicious attack on the agent has been detected, the 
host may also notify the agent owner so that the mobile agent in concern will also be 
protected and further loss caused by the dysfunction of such a compromised agent can be 
prevented. 
The code-provider’s certificates may be useful to prove the identity of a mobile 
agent program. For example, the digital certificate accompanying a Java program that is 
downloaded by the browser from the Internet is important to help the user assess the 
trustworthiness of such a program. People tend to trust the source of the code instead of 
actually verifying the code. However, in the case of mobile agents, this is not sufficient. 
Firstly, mobile agents will typically make multiple hops along their routes to perform e-
commerce tasks.  This means that the route information of mobile agents can be more 
complex and needs to be tracked. Secondly, more information is needed for the host to 
correctly determine the real identities of mobile agents and decide on the security 
procedures to be adopted to deal with incoming agents. That information may include the 
fabricator of the agent, the owner of the agent and the original source community of the 
mobile agent. And thirdly, it is desirable that an integrated mechanism that benefits all, 
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the communities, mobile agents, as well as community hosts can be provided. We 
elaborate in the following: 
• A community must be able to administer and control mobile agents effectively. 
Although there are no actual boundaries in the cyberspace, a community must be 
able to control whether certain types of mobile agents should be allowed to leave 
or enter. The community may have sufficient reasons to prohibit certain types of 
mobile agents from leaving because these agents may disclose sensitive 
community information, or certain agents can have a higher possibility of 
dysfunction if dispatched outside; on the other hand, some mobile agents may be 
banned from entering the community because they have “criminal” records.   
• A host must be able to assess mobile agents before allowing them to execute on 
its machine. Checking of the integrity and signature of the mobile agent code is 
not enough; it is desirable that the host also has the information about the code 
fabricator, the agent owner, the community origin and even the past route of the 
mobile agent to make a correct decision to allocate proper resources and adjust 
security measures. 
• An agent must be able to protect itself by allowing trusted parties to detect any 
compromise of its integrity as soon as possible. The agent must also possess the 
correct credentials to let other parties verify its own identity.  
Bearing the above-mentioned issues in mind, we introduce P/V for mobile agent 
migration among communities. Through the successful verification of P/V, each host is 
better informed that an incoming agent will not perform any malicious attacks. Proper 
security measures for the incoming agent can then be decided. For example, if a mobile 
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agent comes from a notorious community or is fabricated by an agent factory that has 
been reported to produce many malicious agents, it will not pass the security check in the 
beginning. On the other hand, if a mobile agent comes from a well-trusted owner (or 
factory) within a trusted community, security check will still be performed to see whether 
the agent has been compromised or it is on a black list. An agent from a reliable source 
and clear from any black list is more likely to be authorized with more system resources.  
  
3.2 Design Issues 
3.2.1 MSC 
MSC is a trusted entity comprising two parts: immigration service and emigration 
service. Its structure and functions are shown in the following table: 
{Insert Table 1 here} 
  As shown in Table 1, the principal responsibilities of MSC include issuing and 
stamping credentials, i.e.: 
(1) Exit Control: for outgoing agents from the local community, it is responsible 
for issuing passports and stamping passports. 
(2) Entry Control: for incoming agents from remote communities, it is responsible 
for issuing visas and stamping visas. 
Migration control is actually the first step in controlling mobile agents and 
protecting its community hosts. In order to do this, MSC maintains multiple positive lists 
and black lists. A positive list records hosts, factories or communities that are certified by 
a particular CA. Such a list can be requested and updated regularly from CAs. A black 
list records misbehavior of mobile agents that have ever resided or roamed in the 
community, and their associated parties such as factories, owners and communities. 
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These black lists may include a community black list, a factory black list, a butler 
(owner) black list and an agent black list. The black lists may be maintained and updated 
by employing some rules, with different levels and metrics set to make the representation 
more reasonable. The rules are explained below: 
(1) A community black list records untrustworthy communities. A community 
black listed will make all the entities within such a community, such as 
agent factory, agent butler, and fabricated agent untrustworthy. 
(2) A factory black list records untrustworthy agent factories. A factory black 
listed will make all the agents fabricated by this factory untrustworthy. 
(3) An agent butler (owner) black list records untrustworthy agent butlers and 
owners. An agent butler or agent owner black listed will make all the agents 
owned by him untrustworthy. 
(4) An agent black list records untrustworthy agents that have been reported as 
malicious. 
  An entity being black-listed may also affect the reputations of other associated 
entities. For example, mobile agents from the same owner that repeatedly misbehave 
when roaming outside will cause their owner to be black-listed, while significant number 
of mobile agents fabricated by the same agent factory which performs malicious actions 
will cause the manufacturing factory to be black-listed. Note that the black list should be 
updated promptly, and employing sufficient intelligence to make reasonable and correct 
decisions and deductions when necessary. 
With such positive lists and black lists, MSC will be able to control strictly 
whether or not to issue a passport or a visa to a specific agent. For example, some mobile 
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agents carrying sensitive information or performing important internal tasks will not be 
allowed to leave their own community in most situations, and their passport request for 
exit will not be approved. Since passport is the only official document that a mobile agent 
holds when roaming, lacking it will make the agent unrecognized and unaccepted. A 
similar black list may also be maintained by MSC for deciding on the issuing of visas to 
incoming agents. 
As different communities may enforce different security policies, we leave open 
the use of positive/black lists in designing different types of security policies. 
MSC may have more functions besides those mentioned above, such as tracing 
agent routes based on the passport and visas. Note that although SAFER communities 
comply with the SAFER rules, each community still has the flexibility to have its own 
additional entry/exit control rules. Mobile agents roaming to another SAFER-compliant 
community may have problems recognizing the peculiar regulations of the destination 
community. MSC may act as a translator between communities to advise mobile agents 
how to adjust to the new environment.   
 
3.2.2 Passport  
Passport is a certified proof of identity issued by a local MSC. It is the official 
travel document recognized by another SAFER community. Any mobile agent that 
intends to roam to other communities must have a valid passport issued by its local MSC.  
After the agent butler has customized and downloaded a mobile agent to its own 
machine, it must request a passport for the agent from the local MSC before the agent can 
be dispatched. We assume a secure communication protocol is used between the agent 
butler and MSC. The agent butler will need to send the mobile agent with a passport 
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request to the local MSC emigration which will then examine the authenticity of the 
agent code and also the identities of the manufacturer and the agent owner. If these 
verifications yield positive results, MSC needs to refer to its positive/black lists to decide 
whether the agent should be allowed to leave and how long this agent can roam out. After 
all decisions have been made, a passport is issued to the agent. A primitive structure of 
the passport can be shown in Table 2. 
{Insert Table 2 here} 
The first five entries are the identification numbers to help record the origin of a 
mobile agent. PASID is assigned by MSC to represent a unique passport number, and the 
other ID numbers are obtained respectively from the mobile agent itself.  The entry 
“AGTDG” is a message digest produced by calculating the hash value of the agent 
program using collision–resistant hash functions; it binds this passport to the agent that is 
requesting the passport. The example shows an encoded representation of a 128-bit 
message digest. ISSDT is the issuing time/date of the passport and EXPDT is the passport 
expiration time/date. The valid period of a passport can vary, depending on the type of 
the agent and the task it is to complete. Finally, the two stamp entries ENTST and EXIST 
are all initially stamped “FALSE”. These entries will acquire the value of “TRUE” from 
MSC when the agent leaves the local community and enters a remote community. 
After the passport has been created, it is required that the passport issuing party, 
namely the local MSC, to digitally sign the passport. In this way, other parties may be 
able to verify the authenticity of the passport using the public key of MSC and in turn 
verify the authenticity of the mobile agent via the passport entry AGTDG. The procedure 
is shown in Fig. 2. 
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{Insert Fig. 2 here} 
In this way, we are also able to prevent the misuse of passport e.g. attaching a specific 
passport to an unauthorized agent, since the passport is bound to the agent by the passport 
entry AGTDG. In summary, we are able to do the following: 
(1) detect the compromise of a passport, 
(2) detect the compromise of a mobile agent, 
(3) detect the misuse of a passport by an unauthorized agent. 
 
3.2.3 Visa 
 After the mobile agent has obtained a valid passport, it also needs an entry visa 
from its immediate destination. For example, if the agent in community A intends to visit 
community B and community C, it must obtain at least an entry visa from community B 
before it can be accepted by the hosts in this community. In order to obtain a visa, it 
needs to send a copy of its passport over to MSC in the destination community to request 
a visa. Subsequent visas requests can be made via intermediate community MSC along its 
travel route. For example, the visa request for community C may be made through MSC 
in community B, and so on. 
The remote MSC will need to check the authenticity and integrity of the passport 
and decide whether to issue a visa to this incoming agent based on the passport content. 
MSC may look at its positive/black lists to find out if any party associated with the 
incoming agent has any problem. If everything is fine, MSC may attach an entry visa to 
the passport. A primitive structure of a visa is shown in Table 3. 
{Insert Table 3 here} 
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The structure of a visa is quite similar to that of a passport, so we will not discuss 
most entries in detail. Note that we have an entry named “PASDG” which records the 
message digest of the passport. This binds a specific visa to a specific passport, which 
makes impossible the misuse of a visa on another unauthorized passport and in turn on an 
unauthorized agent. To summarize, the binding strategy here is to bind the visa to the 
passport and to bind the passport to the agent, so that unauthorized use of any of these 
three entities (visa, passport, and agent) may be detected. 
The issue of visas can be relaxed to cater to the needs of different security 
requirements. For example, the validity period of the visa, determined from EXPDT and 
ISSDT entries, may vary based on the trust placed on the incoming agent. Two 
communities may even have a mutual visa-waiving agreement in which no visas are 
needed for entry from a friendly community. These measures not only provide more 
flexibility, but also greatly reduce the cost caused by security checks and verifications. 
After the passport and visa have been obtained, an agent is ready to be dispatched 
to other community hosts. This includes three procedures: (1) passport stamping by MSC 
emigration, (2) Visa stamping by the MSC immigration (destination) and (3) roaming to 
the destination hosts to perform its task. Before leaving its current community, a mobile 
agent needs to visit the local MSC again to have its passport entry EXIST stamped as 
“TRUE”. Before roaming to the destination host, the mobile agent is also required to visit 
the destination MSC first to have its visa’s ENTST entry stamped. This will help both 
MSCs to track the route of mobile agents and will also ensure that the mobile agent has 
authorized departure and entry into a designated community. 
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Upon arriving at the host platform, the agent will be subjected to a thorough 
examination by the host. The host will need to verify the authenticity and integrity of the 
passport, visa and the agent itself. The contents of the passport and visa will be extracted 
and examined to decide on the security levels and resource authorization. The host may 
also be required to report to its community MSC the arrival and departure of any mobile 
agent so that the route and behavior of the agent can be traced and analyzed. 
 
4.   Implementation  
4.1   Implementation of MSC, Passport and Visa 
We have implemented the proposed P/V and SAFER migration system in a three-
community simulation environment using Java as the programming language. We 
developed a multiple-hop mobile agent that gathers necessary information from 
community hosts. Java’s security packages and APIs are used to realize encryption, 
digital signatures with DSA-based public/private key of 1024-bit length, and a collision-
resistant hash function using MD-5 algorithm that produces 128-bit message digest. 
Message exchanges for requests and responses will go through a secure communication 
protocol to prevent any attack during these transactions. 
The mobile agent, which originates from community A, is equipped with tasks for 
information gathering at remote hosts in community B and community C (Fig. 3): 
{Insert Fig. 3 here} 
In this implementation, the information-gathering agent is dispatched by its butler 
from community A and will visit Host B in community B and Host C in community C 
sequentially to complete its tasks. As discussed in our earlier sections, the mobile agent 
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needs to obtain a passport from local MSC A and Visa B from MSC B in community B 
before departure and also needs to obtain Visa C before departure for Host C in 
community C.  
The first task for the mobile agent is to request a valid passport from local MSC 
A. The local MSC may evaluate the qualifications of the requesting agent and decide 
whether or not to issue a passport. Fig. 4 gives the screen shot showing the GUIs of the 
agent butler and also the MSC in community A. The highlighted buttons indicate the 
present process.  The dialog box on the right illustrates the situation when the agent has 
been black listed by the local MSC, in this case the passport request will be refused and 
will not be issued. 
{Insert Fig. 4 here} 
After the mobile agent has obtained a valid passport from the local MSC, it needs 
to request an entry visa from its immediate destination Community B, following the 
procedure described in section 3.2.3. At this point, the agent is ready to leave its own 
community and roam to its destination. The passport needs to be stamped by MSC 
emigration in Community A for EXIST entry, and the visa also needs to be stamped by 
MSC immigration in Community B for ENTST entry before the agent can arrive in Host 
B for a complete security examination. 
When a mobile agent needs multiple visas, there are two ways that the agent code, 
passport and visas can be packaged. Fig. 5 illustrates the two solutions for wrapping 
multiple visas B and C.  
{Insert Fig. 5 here} 
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Provided that each entity within a package is digitally signed by its original 
producer, one way is to let the most recent MSC unpack the previous agent package and 
produce a new package signed with its own private key, as shown in solution (a). 
Obviously, this approach relies on the underlying assumption that MSC is a trusted party. 
This is less secure but with more efficiency for signature verification. Another way is to 
leave all previous agent packages intact and simply have new documents added and 
signed by the most recent MSC, as shown in solution (b). This is more secure because 
previous packages are untouched, yet with less efficiency when verifying signatures since 
multiple levels of packages must be unpacked for complete verification. Solution (a) is 
recommended when the agent travels among highly trusted communities, while solution 
(b) is suggested if the agent is to travel among less secured sites.  
 
4.2   Implementation of Positive and Black Lists 
 The lifecycle of a positive/black list may include four stages: construction, 
initialization, maintenance, termination and destruction. When a list is first constructed, it 
is empty with no listed members. Initialization refers to that a list acquiring information 
to establish its initial contents. Maintenance refers to the update of lists, which includes 
the removal or addition of members to existing lists. Termination refers to the stopping of 
list update that leads to a physical destruction of the list later.  
MSC’s list operations include reference and propagation. Reference means that a 
local MSC may refer to its cooperating MSCs (and CAs if a positive list is concerned) for 
shared information on list contents, while propagation means a local MSC may distribute 
its own list information to other cooperating MSCs. During the different stages of list 
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lifecycle, MSC may operate on its lists in different ways. The relationship is illustrated in 
the following figure. 
{Insert Fig. 6 here} 
 During the initialization stage, a local MSC needs to refer to its cooperating 
MSCs (or CAs) for their list information to build its own lists. After the lists have been 
initialized, MSC may continue to refer to other MSCs for list information and at the same 
time may propagate its list information to cooperating communities. Thus during this 
stage, the MSC operations include both reference and propagation. The addition and 
removal of list members may also refer to reports from community hosts (or CAs). MSCs 
from different communities may choose to share and administer a common positive/black 
list database for list update and maintenance or inherit from a common database and add 
their community specific list members for their own use.  
 
4.3   Discussions and System Evaluation 
In order to test and evaluate our prototype implementation, we also developed a 
program that can simulate several malicious attacks to the agent, the passport, and the 
visa. For example, the attacker may tamper with the passport and visa contents, modify 
the mobile agent, or illegally send unstamped agents to other communities. Our 
implementation results have shown that all these attacks can be detected by the MSCs 
and community hosts using our scheme. The following screen shot (Fig. 7) shows an 
unstamped agent trying to sneak into a community while it has been detected by the MSC 
in community B. The unstamped entry “EXIST” in the passport on the left side results in 
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the verification failure by Host B in Community B, and the agent will be treated as 
illegal. 
{Insert Fig. 7 here} 
P/V can also be used to trace mobile agents. Both wrapping solutions discussed in 
the previous section eliminate the possibility that any credential inside the agent package 
can be deleted by attackers, provided that MSCs are trusted parties. By analyzing the 
visas and passport carried by a mobile agent, the destination party will be able to discover 
where the agent has been. If the agent has been to a community that is not secure, the 
destination MSC may enforce a strict security check to ensure its own safety. However, if 
it is seen from the visa record the agent has been traveling among reputable hosts and 
communities, these security measures can be relaxed.  
P/V are also relevant to mobile agents that download code modules (from an 
agent factory for example) to upgrade its functionalities. When a code module in a 
community is to be downloaded by mobile agents, passports and visas can be used to for 
the entry and exit control of such a module. In this way, communities may not only 
control the migration of mobile agents, but also individual code modules. On the other 
hand, since the agent code part may be subjected to change during its migration, some of 
the entries in passport and visas may be affected, for example, the AGTDG entry in 
passport. For such mobile agents holding passport and visas to be authenticated correctly 
by community hosts after code change, the passport and visa contents will need to be 
updated. To alleviate the cost of sending an agent back to its local community for a new 
passport, we suggest using TTPs (together with MSCs) as a potential solution to help 
with agent digest re-computation and passport and visa update. 
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From the above discussions, we may conclude that migration control for mobile 
agents is feasible by using the proposed P/V scheme. We are able to control and trace 
mobile agents when they roam into network communities and hosts. We are also able to 
provide a mechanism to ensure that communities, hosts, and agents will be protected. 
However, it seems that the detection of duplicated passport is still difficult although we 
are able to detect the misuse of passports and visas by unauthorized parties. We have the 
following suggestions to solve this problem. To prevent and detect the illegal duplication 
and misuse of an agent package, which contains the mobile agent, the passport, and visas, 
we suggest that the mobile agent maintain a regular communication with the agent butler. 
The agent sends regular short signals like “heart-beats” to inform its butler where it is and 
how well it is functioning. In this way, the agent butler may be able to detect 
unauthorized duplication if  “heart-beats” becomes abnormal, for example, two “ heart-
beats” from the same agent coming from different hosts.   
Our proposed P/V scheme has some advantages in comparison with the digital 
certificate approach. For one-hop mobile agents that do not roam to a second destination, 
a certificate may be enough, because the agent doesn’t have route information that needs 
to be analyzed. However, for multi-hop mobile agents, the use of passports and visas 
provide more information. They can also be updated promptly and thus remain up-to-date 
compared with the static certificate. Another advantage is that they can be used for 
controlling the entry and exit to communities by mobile agents. 
For e-commerce, there may be requirements that agents prefer to remain 
anonymous during any transaction (as its owner would like to be anonymous). Our P/V 
scheme can accommodate this requirement by allowing agents to be issued passports & 
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visas with their (owner) names not shown. The passport & visas issued to such an 
anonymous agent will be linked to some unique agent ID, where the ID is maintained by 
the agent’s original MSC and any sensitive information regarding the agent will be kept 
secret unless the agent has been involved in any illegal transactions.  
Besides SAFER-compliant communities, there are of course non-SAFER 
communities that do not conform to SAFER standards and regulations. In order to 
promote compatibility, it is critical to provide a compatible passport structure so that it 
can be recognized as a standard certificate carried by mobile agents when visiting non-
SAFER community hosts. As a first step toward an open architecture, we have suggested 
in our implementation by using keyword entries to structure the passport and visa 
content. Thus, what is of importance here is not the actual format of the passport but 
rather the keywords.  
There are some issues falling outside of technical domains but are interesting and 
important for research. For example, the issuing of passports and visas may also be 
subjected to charges as required by community MSCs. In the legal aspect, does a 
community have the right to destroy an agent locally if it is found to be malicious? 
 
5.    Conclusions 
In this paper, we have proposed a security system for mobile agent migration with 
passport and visa. Migration refers to the travel of mobile agents among different 
communities while passports and visas are the credentials issued by the trusted MSCs in 
SAFER to serve as the official travel documents. Besides basic functions similar to 
digital certificates to prove the identities for mobile agents, passports and visa provide 
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more information about mobile agents that can be used to enhance security protection for 
communities, hosts, and mobile agents as well. P/V and migration system also provides a 
solution to effectively manage and control the entry and exit of mobile agents under 
community environments. The implementation result also shows that the proposed 
system is feasible and effective. 
In our future work, we plan to formally define the structures of P/V based on the 
standards of digital certificates. The authentication protocols also need to be refined 
further.  The policy to decide on proper security levels based on available information 
from passports and visas are also an interesting issue for continuing research.  
 
Figures and Tables 
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Fig. 1. SAFER and non-SAFER agent communities 
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Migration Service Center (MSC) 
Functions 
Immigration Service Emigration Service 
Exit Control N/A 
Issuing Passports 
Stamping Passports 
Entry Control 
Issuing Visas 
Stamping Visas 
N/A 
Route Tracing Tracing agent route based on the passport and visas 
Table 1. Structure and functions of MSCs 
 
No. Passport Entries Entry Semantics Examples 
1 PASID Passport ID number COMAIMM001 
2 FACID Agent factory ID number  COMAFAC001 
3 OWNID Agent owner ID number  COMAOWN001 
4 AGTID Mobile agent ID number  COMAFA1OW1 
5 COMID Community ID number COM000001 
6 AGTDG Message digest of the agent  SD 8F DF 4G… 
7 ISSDT Passport issuing time GMT+8 07-05-01 11-25 
8 EXPDT Passport expiration time GMT+8 07-05-01 12-25 
9 EXIST Passport exit stamp FALSE 
10 ENTST Passport entry stamp FALSE 
Table 2. A primitive structure of passport content 
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Start
MSC Signature
Verification
Passport Integrity
Verification
Factory Signature
Verification
Agent Integrity
Verification
AGTDG from Passport
Message Digest of Passport
MSC's Public Key
Success
Factory's Public Key
Faliure
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
 
Fig. 2. Binding and verification of passport in an agent 
 
No. Visa Entries Entry Semantics Examples 
1 VISID Visa ID number COMBIMM001 
2 FACID Agent factory ID number COMAFAC001 
3 OWNID Agent owner ID number COMAOWN001 
4 PASID Passport ID number COMAIMM001 
5 COMID Community ID number COM000002 
6 PASDG Message digest of the passport 34 FH DG D5… 
7 ISSDT Visa issuing time GMT+8 07-05-01 11-40 
8 EXPDT Visa expiration time GMT+8 07-05-01 12-40 
9 EXIST Visa exit stamp FALSE 
10 ENTST Visa entry stamp FALSE 
Table 3. A primitive structure of visa content 
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MSC A
Agent Factory
Agent Butler
MSC B
Host B
MSC C
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SAFER Community A
SAFER Community B
SAFER Community C
Hop 1
Hop 2
Hop 3
1
Documents Issuing Party Via Link
Passport
Visa B
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MSC A
MSC B
MSC C
Hop 1
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Fig. 3. P/V and migration system implementation overview 
 
 
Fig. 4. Passport request refused due to that the mobile agent has been black listed 
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MSC A 
Immigration Emigration 
Mobile Agent 
Passport 
Mobile Agent 
Passport 
Visa B 
MSC B 
Immigration Emigration 
Mobile Agent 
Passport 
Visa B 
Mobile Agent 
Passport 
Visa B 
Visa C 
MSC A 
Immigration Emigration 
Mobile Agent 
Passport 
MSC B 
Immigration Emigration 
Mobile Agent 
Passport 
Visa B 
Mobile Agent 
Passport 
Visa B 
Mobile Agent 
Passport 
Visa B 
Visa C 
signed by MSC A signed by MSC B 
signed by MSC A signed by MSC B 
(a) Agent package unwrapped, signed and wrapped by MSC in 
sequence 
(b)  Agent package wrapped and signed by each MSC in sequence  
 
 Fig. 5. Wrapping of multiple visas by MSCs 
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Posi t i ve/ Bl ack Li st s
MSC-E
Posi t i ve/ Bl ack Li st s
MSC-C
Pos
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ck 
Lis
ts
MSC
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Positive/Black Lists
MSC-D
Posi t i ve
/ Bl ack
Li st s
MSC-A
propagat i on ref erence
Li f ecycl e of  Li st s MSC' s Operat i onsPropagat i on Ref erence
Const ruct i on NO NO
I ni t i al i zat i on NO YES
Mai nt ai nance YES YES
Termi nat i on YES NO
Dest ruct i on NO NO
 
Fig. 6 Lifecycle and MSC’s operations on positive/black lists 
  
 
Fig. 7. Detecting an agent sneaking away holding an unstamped passport 
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